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Emotion is a “double-edged sword” that can either enhance
or hinder various aspects of our cognition and behavior. For
instance, the emotional charge of an event can increase attention
to and memory for that event, whereas task-irrelevant emotional
information may lead to increased distraction away from goal-
relevant tasks. Sometimes, even the same emotionally arousal
event can lead to opposite effects on different aspects of cogni-
tive processing—hearing a gunshot might enhance memory for
central aspects of what was happening at the time, while impair-
ing memory for peripheral details. Stress can also lead to quite
different effects depending on the context and degree of stress.
For example, emotional responses associated with optimal levels
of stress (eustress) may increase performance (e.g., positive emo-
tions associated with wedding preparations), whereas emotions
associated with exposure to extreme levels of stress impair perfor-
mance (e.g., overwhelming worry in the anticipation of a difficult
exam). Importantly, these effects are also susceptible to cogni-
tive influences, typically exerted in the form of emotion control,
whichmay affect both the immediate and the long-term impact of
emotion on cognition. Although during the last decades impor-
tant progress has beenmade in understanding emotion-cognition
interactions, a number of aspects remain unclear.
The present e-book and research topic comprise a collec-
tion of manuscripts discussing emerging evidence regarding
the mechanisms underlying emotion-cognition interactions in
healthy functioning and alterations associated with clinical con-
ditions, in which such interactions are dysfunctional. Co-hosted
by the Frontiers in Neuroscience—Integrative Neuroscience and
Frontiers in Psychology—Emotion Science, our special research
topic attracted a large number of outstanding contributions,
based on approaches spanning from behavioral and lesion
to pharmacological and brain imaging, and including empiri-
cal, theoretical, and review papers alike. The contributions are
grouped around the following seven main themes distributed
across the two hosting journals: (1) Emotion and Selectivity in
Attention and Memory, (2) The Impact of Emotional Distraction;
Linking Enhancing and Impairing Effects of Emotion, (3) What
Really is the Role of the Amygdala?, (4) Age Differences in Emotion
Processing; The Role of Emotional Valence, (5) Affective Face
Processing, Social Cognition, and Personality Neuroscience, (6)
Stress, Mood, Emotion, and the Prefrontal Cortex; The Role of
Control in the Stress Response, (7) Emotion-Cognition Interactions
in Clinical Conditions. This comprehensive approach allowed an
integrative understanding of the available evidence and identifi-
cation of concrete venues for future investigations.
EMOTION AND SELECTIVITY IN ATTENTION AND MEMORY
Perhaps the most studied issue in the history of emotion-
cognition interactions is how emotion influences the scope or
selectivity of attention and memory. Does arousal or negative
emotion lead to the narrowing of the scope of attention? Do
arousing stimuli create a trade-off in memory such that they are
remembered better than similar neutral stimuli, while they impair
memory for surrounding information? How do goals and the
type of emotion relate to these selectivity effects? The papers in
this section provide an excellent overview of current issues and
controversies regarding this topic.
Even in the absence of strong emotion, different stimuli com-
pete for representation in the brain (Desimone and Duncan,
1995; Beck and Kastner, 2009). Attention helps modulate this
competition, even at the synaptic level (Briggs et al., 2013).
Arousal interacts with these other factors. When a stimulus is
inherently emotionally arousing, it has a competitive advantage
over stimuli nearby in space or time (Bradley et al., 2012). For
instance, people tend to remember foreground objects better
when they are emotional than neutral, but at the cost of poorer
memory for the background scenes (Steinmetz and Kensinger,
2013). These effects favoring emotionally salient objects over the
surrounding less salient context become stronger with a night
of sleep (Payne et al., 2012). Such trade-off effects also occur in
people with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) but not in
those who experienced trauma in the past without developing
PTSD (Steinmetz et al., 2012). These intriguing findings suggest
that people in whom arousing items do not have as much of
a competitive advantage might have a lower propensity toward
PTSD.
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The competitive advantages for emotional stimuli work across
time, as well as space. Wang et al. (2012) review the phenomenon
known as emotion-induced blindness, in which emotionally
arousing stimuli can disrupt perception of other target stimuli
that appear soon afterwards in the same location. They argue that
emotion-induced blindness results from competition between the
targets and the emotional distractors, with the distractors gaining
priority due to their goal relevance. But this raises the question
of whether emotional stimuli really do get more attention than
would be predicted simply by their visual salience. To test this,
Niu et al. (2012) had participants code which regions within
pictures were most affectively salient and then had automated
software compute which regions were most perceptually salient
and measured eye movements to assess attention. They found
that affectively salient regions attracted more attention than per-
ceptually salient regions, especially among pictures rated high in
arousal. But findings that recalling autobiographical memories
in response to emotional cue words impairs subsequent percep-
tion more than recalling in response to neutral cue words indicate
that emotion can impair perception even if there are no external
differences in perceptual salience (Young et al., 2012).
Thus, papers in this section continue a long line of research
indicating that emotionally arousing stimuli attract more atten-
tion and are remembered better than competing stimuli.
However, the question of whether this has to do with arousal,
per se, and not just with the nature of the stimuli, requires meth-
ods in which arousal is manipulated independently of the stimuli
characteristics. To do this, Echterhoff and Wolf (2012) manipu-
lated stress after participants watched a video of a burglary, as well
as whether participants anticipated something distressing during
the video. They found that the recognition advantage for central
event items over peripheral event items was largest when distress
was anticipated and there was post-event stress. Thus, arousal
both during an event and immediately afterwards can enhance the
relative memory advantage for salient events that just occurred.
The notion that arousal enhances processing of salient stimuli
and impair processing of other stimuli is consistent with Mather
and Sutherland’s (2011) arousal-biased competition theory, in
which arousal increases the stakes of neural competition between
stimuli representations, such that there are both “winner-take-
more” and “loser-take-less” effects. In their present study, Lee
et al. (2012) tested arousal-biased competition mechanisms by
manipulating arousal during a 2-session perceptual learning task.
One session included interspersed emotionally arousing negative
pictures whereas the other session included interspersed neutral
pictures. Participants’ task was to find the discrepant line from
among an array of lines. In one condition, the discrepant line
was always tilted 55◦ among a field of 50◦ distractors. In another
condition, the discrepant line was always tilted 55◦ among a field
of 80◦ distractors. In both conditions, participants had to iden-
tify the exact tilt of the target line from a set of five alternatives
every so often. Thus, in one condition, participants were learning
about a salient item (a line very different from its competitors)
whereas in the other they were learning about a non-salient line.
Competition models of salience (e.g., Itti and Koch, 2000) predict
that competition will favor the salient line, enhancing its repre-
sentation, but that mutual suppression will impair the non-salient
line, leading its representation to be impaired. Indeed, in the
salient-target condition, the interspersed emotional pictures
enhanced participants’ perceptual tuning curves as indicated by
more accurate memory for the tilt of the target line. In contrast,
in the non-salient-target condition, emotion impaired learning
about the target line, leading to broader estimated tuning curves.
Such work follows up on other recent findings that emotional
arousal enhances processing of neutral but perceptually salient
stimuli while impairing processing of competing less salient stim-
uli (Sutherland and Mather, 2012; Lee et al., 2014). Also, recent
findings indicate that emotional pictures (positive or negative)
strengthen high priority memory traces but weaken low priority
memory traces, when priority was determined by goal relevance
(Sakaki et al., 2014). Thus, arousal can have opposite effects on low
and high priority representations, with both bottom-up salience and
top-down goal relevance as key determinants of priority.
However, two reviews in this book present different views
on how emotion influences selectivity. In their review, Harmon-
Jones et al. (2012) argue that what really matters is the motiva-
tional intensity of emotion. Affective states high in motivational
intensity should narrow cognitive scope while those low in moti-
vational intensity should broaden it. Kaplan et al. (2012) also
highlight the role of motivation but argue that a critical factor
is whether goals have been achieved yet or not. They posit that
emotions experienced before goal attainment or loss should lead
to memory narrowing while emotions experienced afterwards
should broaden the scope of attention and encoding. One key
issue in trying to understand whether thesemotivational accounts
contradict or are complementary to arousal-biased competition
account is that the measures differ. Most of the studies examin-
ing how motivational intensity influences attention have assessed
howmuch people attend to the local or global features of the same
information. For instance, in the Navon (1977) letters task partic-
ipants see large letters composed of smaller letters and attentional
biases to the large or small letters is measured. Motivational
intensity shifts these local/global biases. But the arousal-biased
competition account requires knowledge about the relative base-
line priority of the small and large letters. Given that there are
individual differences in whether the large or small letters are
noticed more quickly, there is no clear high priority item across
participants. Arousal-biased competition processes should favor
the local features even more for those who already tend to favor
the local letters and vice versa for those who tend to favor the
global letters. Likewise, it is not clear what motivational intensity
would predict in the type of paradigm used by Sutherland and
Mather (2012), in which some letters are more perceptually
salient because they contrast more with the background, but they
are all equally central in the image and all have the same size.
Finally, the opinion paper by Chiu et al. (2013) proposes that
other factors should also be considered when investigating the
impact of emotion on memory. Namely, while extant theories
tend to focus on how attentional biases in the perception of emo-
tional stimuli influence memory, future research would benefit
from differentiating between source, contextual, and relational
information, as a way to further our understanding of the effects
of emotion on various types of memory phenomena (Chiu et al.,
2013).
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THE IMPACT OF EMOTIONAL DISTRACTION; LINKING
ENHANCING AND IMPAIRING EFFECTS OF EMOTION
A related key question in the emotion literature is how emo-
tionally arousing stimuli can also cause distraction and disrupt
performance. Novel evidence emerging from human (Hart et al.,
2012; Jasinska et al., 2012a,b; Shafer and Dolcos, 2012; Dolcos
et al., 2013) and animal (Matthews et al., 2012) research con-
firm and advance the initial view (Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006)
that processing of task-irrelevant emotional information is asso-
ciated with opposing patterns of response in ventral emotion
processing regions, such as the amygdala (showing enhanced
activity), and in dorsal executive brain regions, such as the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC, showing reduced activ-
ity) (reviewed in Iordan et al., 2013). New evidence shows
that the response to emotional distraction can be modu-
lated by actual or expected task difficulty (Hart et al., 2012;
Jasinska et al., 2012b; Shafer and Dolcos, 2012), stress hor-
mones (Henckens et al., 2012), and genetic differences (Jasinska
et al., 2012a), as well as by personality differences in traits
indexing increased sensitivity to processing task-irrelevant infor-
mation, such as attentional impulsivity (Dolcos et al., 2013).
Interestingly, there is also evidence that emotional “distrac-
tion” may not always impair performance on the primary
task (Jackson et al., 2012; Truebutschek and Egner, 2012).
Finally, there is also evidence that increased emotional reactiv-
ity in clinical patients with emotional and attentional disorders
is associated with increased impact of emotional distraction
(Singhal et al., 2012).
Notably, studies in this section also provide initial evidence
regarding the neural mechanisms linking enhancing and impair-
ing effects of emotional distraction. Whereas emotional distraction
initially impairs perception (Shafer and Dolcos, 2012) and work-
ing memory (Dolcos et al., 2013), it enhances long-term episodic
memory for the distractors themselves. The emotional charge of
the distracting information and the difficulty of the main cogni-
tive task influence both the initial emotional distraction (Shafer
et al., 2012) and long-term memory (Shafer and Dolcos, 2012).
Also, Dolcos et al. (2013) showed that the same amygdala area was
involved in both enhancing and impairing effects of emotion, but
its engagement was associated with opposing influences on activ-
ity in brain regions responsible for maintaining performance in
the initial main cognitive task (dlPFC, showing reduced response
to emotional distraction) vs. those underlying the long-term
enhancing effects of emotion (MTL memory system, showing
enhanced response) (see also Dolcos and Denkova, 2014).
Interestingly, the study by Dolcos et al. (2013) also shows that
the involvement of cognitive control mechanisms to cope with
emotional distraction (reflected in increased activity in the ven-
trolateral prefrontal cortex, vlPFC) not only protects against the
emotional distraction but also leads to enhanced memory for
the distractors themselves. This finding provides novel evidence
regarding the neural mechanisms underlying a behavioral phe-
nomenon that was observed in early studies investigating the
initial and long-term effects of emotion regulation. Namely, the
engagement of specific emotion regulation strategies to cope with
the initial exposure to emotional situations may also lead to
increased memory for the emotional aspects of that experience
(Dillon et al., 2007). This issue also has relevance for under-
standing clinical conditions, such as PTSD, where dysfunctional
links between immediate and long-term effects of emotion may
be associated with erroneous initial encoding of memories for
traumatic events due to heightened arousal, as discussed in the
opinion article by Dolcos (2013).
WHAT REALLY IS THE ROLE OF THE AMYGDALA?
Current theories give the amygdala a fundamental role in enhanc-
ing attention and memory of emotional stimuli (Murty et al.,
2010; Dolcos et al., 2011, 2012; Mather and Sutherland, 2011;
Pourtois et al., 2013). Yet, there are still multiple debates about
the exact nature of its role. For instance, there has been a long-
standing debate about the automaticity of emotion processing
and about the nature and significance of dissociating between
subcortical automatic and non-conscious route to the amygdala
from cortical routes for processing emotional stimuli (for recent
reviews, see Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010; Tamietto and de Gelder,
2010). Consistent with the traditional view regarding emotion-
attention interaction (Ohman et al., 2001), in their present con-
tribution, De Gelder et al. (2012) argue that work using moving
bodies expressing emotion or not indicates that there is an early
emotion processing route that is independent of attention and
involves a subcortical route to the amygdala; for recent evidence
reconciling the traditional and competing views, see Shafer et al.
(2012).
In their review, Chau and Galvez (2012) argue that while
the amygdala is widely acknowledged to play a key role in the
initial acquisition and consolidation of fear-related memories,
it also is involved in non-fear-related memories, such as eye-
blink conditioning. They concur with previous accounts that the
amygdala works as a salience detector to enhance learning of bio-
logically significant or behaviorally relevant events (Davis and
Whalen, 2001; Sander et al., 2003; Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010;
Pourtois et al., 2013), so that other brain regions are more likely
to consolidate those important learned responses.
One puzzle in the literature is the finding that patients with
Alzheimer’s disease, still show emotional enhancement effects in
memory (e.g., Kazui et al., 2000; Nashiro and Mather, 2011). In
their review, Klein-Koerkamp et al. (2012) argue that Alzheimer’s
patients may have compensatory or “reinforced” neural projec-
tions between brain areas involved in the elicitation of emotional
enhancement. This is an intriguing hypothesis, but it would also
be useful to consider other aspects of arousal that may contribute
to enhanced memory, beyond the amygdala. In their paper, Gold
and Korol (2012) review neuroendocrine influences on emotional
memory. They argue that increases in blood glucose levels that
result from epinephrine release during arousal augment neu-
rotransmitter release and energy metabolism in brain regions
involved in learning and memory. However, the impact of glu-
cose on memory is impaired in normal aging and even further
in Alzheimer’s disease (Gold and Korol, 2012), thus there is no
obvious answer as to how memory continues to be enhanced by
emotion in those with Alzheimer’s disease, albeit to a less robust
degree than for healthy older adults.
The amygdala does not always lead to enhanced process-
ing. As discussed in the previous section, the same amygdala
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 83 | 3
Dolcos et al. Emotion-cognition interactions
area appears to mediate both impairing and enhancing effects
of emotional distraction, but through different effects on activ-
ity in the dlPFC (decreased) vs. MTL (increased) (Dolcos et al.,
2013). In addition, while it enhances new emotional learn-
ing, lesion work with animals indicates that the amygdala
impairs the flexibility of learning, such that reversal learning or
extinction are facilitated after amygdala lesions (Izquierdo and
Murray, 2005; Stalnaker et al., 2007). When intact, the amyg-
dala seems to work against orbitofrontal mechanisms that help
update memories. This model is consistent with recent find-
ings that updating the context of emotionally arousing infor-
mation is more difficult and involves greater activation of fron-
topolar/orbitofrontal cortex than updating neutral information
(Mather and Knight, 2008; Novak and Mather, 2009; Sakaki
et al., 2011; Nashiro et al., 2012). As shown in the present
contribution by Nashiro et al. (2013b), the behavioral dis-
advantage in updating emotional compared to neutral asso-
ciative information is maintained in older adults, as is the
increased activity in the orbitofrontal cortex and increased neg-
ative amygdala-PFC functional connectivity when doing emo-
tional reversal learning, compared to neutral reversal learning
(Nashiro et al., 2013a).
Thus, across the life span, the amygdala works to maintain asso-
ciations within existing emotional memories, such as what a cue
predicts, where a particular picture was, or which item something
was paired with, making emotional memories more resistant to
flexible updating. Also relevant are the present findings that it is
more difficult to learn whether items previously associated with
high rewards than those associated with low rewards were in a
new list (Madan et al., 2012). Thus, both reward and arousal
make it more difficult to learn new contextual information about
items. However, more research is needed to understand if the
mechanisms of impaired updating are the same for reward and
arousal.
AGE DIFFERENCES IN EMOTION PROCESSING; THE ROLE OF
EMOTIONAL VALENCE
People’s intuition tends to be that emotion should follow the same
downward trajectory with age as cognition, such that negative
emotion increases as people grow older. However, longitudinal
studies reveal that, in fact, rates of negative affect (NA) tend to
decrease through much of adulthood (Carstensen et al., 2000;
Charles et al., 2001). These shifts in emotional experience are
reflected in cognitive processes as well, leading to age-by-valence
interactions (known as the “positivity effect”) in attention and
memory (Mather and Carstensen, 2005). Specifically, older adults
tend to favor positive stimuli more and negative stimuli less than
younger adults, in their attention and memory. Since initial find-
ings of an age-related positivity effect in attention and memory
were published about a decade ago (Charles et al., 2003; Mather
and Carstensen, 2003), there has been a great deal of interest in
the effect. In their present review paper, Reed and Carstensen
(2012), discuss how the pattern of findings indicate that the
positivity effect is not a manifestation of cognitive decline, but
instead requires controlled processing (Mather and Carstensen,
2005; St. Jacques et al., 2010). Given its reliance on goal-directed
processes, the positivity effect is malleable and context sensitive.
For instance, manipulating concurrent cognitive load can dimin-
ish or reverse it (Mather and Knight, 2005; Knight et al., 2007),
something that cannot be accounted for by a cognitive decline
account. Reed and Carstensen (2012) also point out that more
work is needed to test whether positivity in cognitive processing helps
emotional well-being and influences decisions.
Several of the empirical papers in this collection addressed
other relevant issues. Noh et al. (2012) investigated whether
the links between positive and NA and attentional functioning
varies as a function of age. They found that higher levels of
positive and lower levels of NA were associated with enhanced
orienting efficiency in older adults, but neither of them had
any influence on executive attention. Overall, the findings by
Noh et al. (2012) suggest that positive and NA may influence
attentional functioning in distinct ways, but that these patterns
may depend on the age group. Pollock et al. (2012) examined
adult age differences in processing emotional faces using a psy-
chological refractory period paradigm. Younger adults showed
significantly higher P1 responses for angry than for happy faces,
whereas older adults showed no difference, revealing another
measure on which positivity effect age-by-valence interactions
turn up; P1 is a positive event-related potential component
occurring ∼100ms post-stimulus onset, which was linked with
amygdala modulation of attention to emotional faces (Rotshtein
et al., 2010). Kalpouzos et al. (2012) examined what they call
the “negativity effect” or the memory advantage for negative
emotional information over neutral information. They assessed
recognition memory for neutral and negative scenes after 1 and
3 weeks in younger and older adults using fMRI. As they did not
include positive stimuli, they were unable to assess whether age-
by-valence interactions changed over multiple testing sessions.
However, they found that older participants were better able to
discriminate old from new scenes if they were neutral than neg-
ative, whereas this was not the case for younger participants.
Whereas younger adults showed changes in brain activity during
retrieval across the different retention intervals, the older adults
did not. While, overall, the effects of delay were similar across
age groups, the older adults were close to floor in their perfor-
mance by the last test, which might have reduced the ability to see
effects.
Although the positivity effect occurs in many studies examin-
ing attention and memory, it is not clear whether similar factors
influence the ability to read facial emotions. Older adults show
impaired recognition of emotions such as sadness and anger, but
they are equally good or better than younger adults at recogniz-
ing disgust (Ruffman et al., 2008). In their present contribution,
Ebner et al. (2012) provided new evidence that brain activation
patterns are similar across younger and older adults when iden-
tifying facial expressions, indicating that, on the whole, similar
PFC mechanisms are involved for both age groups. Moreover,
Biss et al. (2012) provided new evidence of an emotion-cognition
interaction that operates similarly across age groups. Their study
revealed that, for older adults, positive mood states led to greater
implicit memory for distracting words shown during a task,
an effect previously shown in younger adults. Thus, positive
affect seems to influence attention regulation similarly across age
groups.
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AFFECTIVE FACE PROCESSING, SOCIAL COGNITION, AND
PERSONALITY NEUROSCIENCE
The emerging fields of social and personality neurosciences also
provide important evidence regarding emotion-cognition inter-
actions, while furthering our understanding of the neural mech-
anisms of adaptive social behaviors and of individual variation in
the susceptibility or resilience to emotional disturbances. Human
faces are essential in conveying important social information, and
facial stimuli have been used to investigate a variety of aspects
of social cognition, from simple emotional reactions (Morris
et al., 1996) to more complex affective states (Bartels and Zeki,
2004; Nitschke et al., 2004). However, despite a long history of
investigation of basic facial emotional expressions (Ekman and
Oster, 1979), only relatively recently research has begun to con-
sider other socially relevant dimensions conveyed by faces, such
as trustworthiness (Todorov et al., 2009).
Processing of emotional (particularly fearful) faces involves
the amygdala and fast, possibly automatic, mechanisms (Whalen
et al., 1998; Sergerie et al., 2008; Adolphs, 2010; Iordan et al.,
2013); but see Pessoa (2013). However, less is known about the
immediate motor and cognitive consequences of such fast pro-
cessing. New evidence from the present collection (Bocanegra and
Zeelenberg, 2012) shows that masked fearful faces enhance the
activation and inhibition phases of motor response to a target,
even before conscious perception of the target. Evidence from
another study suggests that when identification of facial expres-
sion occurs, cognitive control mechanisms also come into play
(Ebner et al., 2012). Specifically, the authors argue that increased
engagement of the dorsomedial PFC (dmPFC) for angry faces
reflects cognitive control mechanisms involved to regulate neg-
ative emotions. Interestingly, similar findings were observed in
both young and older participants, although older participants
tended to show more extended activations of dmPFC to angry
faces, possibly reflecting increased emotion control (St. Jacques
et al., 2010).
Evaluation of emotional faces in social contexts and their
encoding into memory are needed in order to navigate in social
environments, and to decide whom to thrust and approach or to
avoid (Vrticka et al., 2009). Approach and avoidance behaviors are
of particular importance in social cognition and have been linked
to social inclusion or exclusion, as discussed in the present review
by Powers and Heatherton (Powers and Heatherton, 2012). The
authors suggest that approach and avoidance behaviors could
occur also concomitantly—e.g., people feeling social exclusion
may simultaneously employ both affiliating and defending strate-
gies in order to establish new social connections and to avoid
negative consequences of social exclusion. Regarding social exclu-
sion, the present review by Cacioppo and Cacioppo (2012) also
emphasizes that the impact of subjectively perceived isolation
is much greater than that of real isolation, and that perceived
(or experimentally induced) social isolation modulates similar
brain mechanisms to those involved in the perception of emo-
tional and social stimuli (dmPFC, temporoparietal junction—
TPJ, ventral striatum) (Cacioppo and Cacioppo, 2012).Moreover,
Masuda et al. (2012) provide evidence regarding the role of cul-
tural differences in processing social cues, and highlights the
importance of considering contextual differences in interpreting
facial signals as a function of cultural variations. Finally, by
considering three affective signals conveyed by faces (emo-
tional expressions, attractiveness, and trustworthiness), Tsukiura
(2012) proposes a model suggesting mutual interactions between
affective and memory systems, which explain why emotional
and socially relevant faces are better remembered than neutral
ones.
A long standing view is that approach and avoidant tem-
peramental/motivational tendencies are associated with patterns
of lateralization in the frontal regions, with the left side being
associated with approach and the right side with avoidance
(Harmon-Jones et al., 2010). However, as discussed in the present
review by Miller et al. (2013), recent studies provide evidence
that different sub-regions within the PFC have different roles
in various aspects of emotion processing, and therefore can
show different lateralization patterns, which may go beyond
the simple left-right frontal conceptualization initially proposed.
Other authors adopt a goal-related perspective regarding moti-
vational tendencies, and investigate behavior in terms of pro-
motion/accomplishment-oriented tendencies (planning to “make
good things happen”) vs. prevention-oriented tendencies (plan-
ning to “avoid bad things from happening”) dichotomy (Higgins,
2012). In their present investigation, Strauman et al. (2013)
provide evidence regarding the neural mechanisms underlying
activation of promotion and prevention goals by priming par-
ticipants’ own ideal and ought goals, which are mapped onto
dissociable neural substrates in healthy functioning (Eddington
et al., 2007) and are altered in clinical cohorts (Eddington et al.,
2009). Overall, the evidence emerging from these contributions
underscore the importance of considering the interplay between
emotion and cognition at various levels, from basic processing of
social cues to their integration in larger behavioral and cultural
contexts. Such integration not only influences individuals’ own
adaptive social behavior but may also have consequences on their
moral social decisions, as also discussed here by Cummins and
Cummins (2012).
STRESS, MOOD, EMOTION, AND THE PREFRONTAL CORTEX;
THE ROLE OF CONTROL IN THE STRESS RESPONSE
Another important question in the emotion literature is how
long–term affective states, such as those produced by stressful
experiences, mood manipulations, or associated with personal-
ity traits, influence cognition and behavior. It is widely accepted
that optimal levels of stress benefit cognitive functioning, whereas
extreme and/or chronic levels of stress impair it. But how much
stress is too much stress, and how do specific stressors and indi-
vidual differences influence the experienced stress and its impact
on cognitive functioning?
Novel evidence from the present collection points to both
beneficial and detrimental effects of stress and mood on cogni-
tive functioning and the associated neural mechanisms, which
are influenced by manipulations of stress hormones (Henckens
et al., 2012), personality traits indexing emotion regulation and
NA (Crocker et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2013), and previous his-
tory of stress (Wang et al., 2013), as well as by age (Biss et al.,
2012) and genetic (Qin et al., 2012) differences. Henckens et al.
(2012) provide evidence for (i) rapid effects of cortisol reflected in
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impaired selective attention and increased emotional interference,
driven by bottom-up processing in the amygdala and its inter-
action with the PFC, and (ii) slow effects of cortisol promoting
sustained attention, by reducing bottom-up driven processing in
visual brain areas and potentially leading to restoration of brain
functioning after stress. The authors propose a more adaptive
view of the impact of cortisol on attention and emotion, with an
initial effect optimizing detection of potential threat at the cost
of impaired cognitive processing, and a delayed effect normal-
izing cognitive brain functions following stress (Dolcos, 2014).
Crocker et al. (2012) points to joint and dissociable effects of
state and trait NA on attention. Specifically, when combined, state
and trait NA produced the strongest impact on performance in
an attentional task, but they were linked to different aspects of
processing—i.e., state NA was linked to excessive stimulus-driven
processing of salient irrelevant information, whereas trait NA was
linked to difficulty in engaging top-down attentional control to
deal with irrelevant information. Wang et al. (2013) show that
the impact of early-life stress on activity in the vmPFC (a region
involved in emotion control) is linked to variations in personality
traits indexing diminished (rumination) or enhanced (mindful-
ness) emotion control. This, in turn, influences susceptibility or
resilience to emotional challenges, in response to exposure to
repeated mild stressful situations, linked to reduced vs. enhanced
vmPFC activity, respectively. Finally, Qin et al. (2012) further
show that the effect of moderate stress on working memory per-
formance and PFC functioning is modulated by genetic variations
in the genes encoding the Catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT;
an enzyme that degrades catecholamines such as dopamine,
epinephrine, and norepinephrine), with some allele combina-
tions being associated with positive whereas others with negative
effects.
Besides individual variations (Kanske, 2012; Qin et al., 2012;
Wang et al., 2013), other factors linked to available resources,
task-relevance, and top-down modulation can also explain dif-
ferential impact of affect and stress on cognition, as discussed
in the review by Cohen and Henik (2012). Moreover, Froeliger
et al. (2012) provides preliminary evidence that the engagement
in meditation practice could help avoid the negative impact of
emotion on cognition, which is consistent with the idea that the
engagement of reactive or proactive strategies of cognitive con-
trol can alleviate detrimental effects of emotion (Patterson et al.,
2012).
An interesting idea that also emerges from the present stud-
ies investigating these issues is that the effect of stress on cognitive
functioning and the associated neural mechanisms can be mod-
ulated by the feeling of control and/or the subjective experience
of stress (Buetti and Lleras, 2012; Henderson et al., 2012; Kerr
et al., 2012). Specifically, the presence of controllability can help
improve cognitive performance, when stress is perceived as mod-
erate (Henderson et al., 2012), and abolish distortions in time
perception of negative compared to positive events (Buetti and
Lleras, 2012). Moreover, the presence of controllability also affects
the PFC functioning, with the vmPFC showing increased activ-
ity during controllable anticipation response (Kerr et al., 2012).
This finding can be linked to Wang et al.’s finding revealing
decreased vmPFC response in people with early-life stress and
high trait rumination (Wang et al., 2013). Interestingly, while
there is evidence that extreme subjective experience of stress can
have detrimental effects on cognitive functioning, especially in
uncontrollable situations (Henderson et al., 2012), the low per-
ceived stress in acute stressful situations can also have detrimental
effects on decision making, by favoring risky decisions (Lempert
et al., 2012), which has relevance for understanding addictive
gambling behavior.
EMOTION-COGNITION INTERACTIONS IN CLINICAL
CONDITIONS
Although the terms emotion and cognition describe concepts that
involve overlapping functions and recruit overlapping circuits
within the brain, thinking about their distinctive features and how
they interact can be quite fruitful. This is especially the case in the
domain of psychiatric disorders, where dysfunctional emotion-
cognition interactions are among the most obvious impairments.
For instance, Dolcos (2013) points out that in PTSD both the
enhancing and impairing aspects of emotion-cognition interac-
tions are exacerbated and detrimental. This statement is also true
for the majority of other psychiatric disorders. A series of original
and review articles in the present collection discuss the relation-
ship between emotion and cognition in a variety of psychiatric
disorders including, depression, PTSD, schizophrenia, autism,
Alzheimer’s disease, and substance abuse.
MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER
Major depressive disorder (MDD) has been posited to result
from dis-coordination between cognitive and affective neural sys-
tems (Mayberg, 1997), which could be a cause and/or a result
of negative affective biases, the core cognitive deficits of MDD.
In this book, Foland-Ross and Gotlib (2012) summarize evi-
dence from the literature regarding the negative bias in MDD
and note that depression is characterized by difficulty in disen-
gaging from negative material, once it initially captures attention,
rather than from rapid orientation to negative stimuli. However,
this phenomenon is not specific to depression, as also shown by
the Singhal and colleagues’ study using event-related potential
recordings in adolescents with comorbid psychiatric disorders,
such as attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anxi-
ety, or other psychiatric disorders (Singhal et al., 2012). This
study provided evidence that effortful activity is required in these
patients to redirect attention from task-irrelevant negative stimuli
to processing goal-relevant information (Singhal et al., 2012). The
negative affective bias has also been extended to emotionally pos-
itive materials (LeMoult et al., 2012). The study by LeMoult et al.
(2012) shows that when happy emotional expressions are used as
primes, healthy adults show the strongest interference, whereas
the MDD group fail to show such positive bias.
PTSD
Like depression, negative affective biases can also be found in
PTSD (Aupperle et al., 2012), and reflects difficulty in disen-
gaging from, rather than facilitated detection of, negative stim-
uli. In PTSD, however, there is also heightened trauma-related
reactivity, along with paradoxical changes in memory process-
ing (Cohen et al., 2006; Parsons and Ressler, 2013). On the one
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hand, emotionally salient traumatic memories tend to induce
uncontrolled recollection and re-experiencing of memories for
traumatic events. On the other hand, PTSD patients tend to avoid
stimuli associated with the trauma, which may induce amnesia
for details of the traumatic event (Brewin et al., 2011). All three
review articles on PTSD (Brown and Morey, 2012; Hayes et al.,
2012; Dolcos, 2013) in this book point to exacerbated enhanc-
ing and hindering effects of emotion on cognition in PTSD.
Uncontrolled recollection of distressing memories may lead to
impairment in cognitive task performance due to enhanced emo-
tional distraction (Dolcos, 2013). Furthermore, emotional inter-
ference in PTSD can be extended beyond trauma-related materi-
als to trauma-unrelated emotional materials, as emphasized in the
review by Brown and Morey (2012), who propose two disrupted
networks in PTSD, a trauma-activated network and an emotion-
activated network. There is also evidence that PTSD patients may
be more prone to falsely remembering novel information (Hayes
et al., 2012). However, in the study from the present collection
mentioned above (Steinmetz et al., 2012), PTSD patients did not
show greater emotional trade-offs (greater memory to emotional
items than neutral background) than controls or trauma-exposed
people without PTSD, unlike the trauma-exposed non-PTSD
group which showed such trade-off. More studies are needed
to elucidate these issues, and understanding the neural mecha-
nisms underlying emotional and cognitive deficits in PTSD may
provide insight for developing novel cognitive-based behavioral
therapies.
SCHIZOPHRENIA
According to Anticevic and Corlett (2012), patients with
schizophrenia have an intact ability to perceive emotion “in the
moment.” The core deficit of the illness is a dysfunction in “cold”
cognitive processes, predominantly in working memory, which is
associated with markedly reduced activity in the dlPFC in these
patients. Thus, it has been suggested that it is the dysfunction
of working memory that gives rise to difficulty in maintaining
affective/reward-related information representation in guiding
motivational behaviors. Future studies could demonstrate the
link between the lack of “maintenance” signals following affec-
tive/reward cues to deficits in future goal-directed behavior and
negative symptoms (such as anhedonia) in schizophrenia. Unlike
depressed patients who are distracted by negative information
and unable to disengage from negative events to on-going goal-
guided events, schizophrenic patients have difficulty in filtering
task-irrelevant distracting information. They tend to abnormally
assign neutral stimuli as salient and have deficits in generat-
ing appropriate prediction error signals, so that they blur the
distinctiveness of responses to events that violate vs. confirm
expectations, which could lead to delusions.
AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS (ASD)
These neurodevelopmental disorders affect neural systems largely
related to social-emotional and social cognition processes. While
the field predominantly views ASD as involving deficits primarily
in the “social cognition network,” Gaigg’s present paper (2012)
questions this notion. In his review, Gaigg argues that the social
deficits in ASD could be the consequence of abnormal emotional
responses to the environment “which modulate a wide range of
cognitive processes including those that are relevant to navigat-
ing the social world.” Gaigg concludes that ASD involves relatively
preserved function in basic emotional evaluation (i.e., arousal-
related responses to emotionally salient pictures and words),
but is associated with difficulties in more complex emotional
processes related to social environment, including identification
and interpretations of emotions in others. Individuals with ASD
have difficulties in the response to ambiguous and unpredictable
events in the environment, and in learning about the emotional
significance of stimuli that predict biologically relevant events.
Gaigg posits an intriguing hypothesis that the basic amygdala
functions that are mediated by sub-cortical networks involving
sensory afferents from the thalamus and efferents to brain-stem
nuclei are preserved in ASD, but the connections with cortical
or sub-cortical regions modulating amygdala appear to be com-
promised. However, this idea needs confirmation from future
studies.
ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE (AD)
Turning to alterations in emotion-cognition interactions in clin-
ical conditions affecting later developmental stages, an intriguing
aspect concerns the possibility that relatively better preserved
emotion processing could buffer memory deficits in AD patients.
According to the present review by Klein-Koerkamp et al. (2012),
both enhancing and impairing effects of emotion on memory
can be found in AD, and that these discrepant findings could
be due to differences among studies in a number of factors,
as follows. (1) Task difficulty (easy vs. hard): tasks that are
too easy for healthy controls or too difficult for AD patients
could lead to ceiling vs. floor effect respectively, which may
obscure the memory-enhancing effect of emotion. (2) Task type
(recollection vs. recognition): typically, the memory-enhancing
effect of emotion tends to be stronger in recollection than in
recognition tasks, and hence this may also explain discrepant
findings observed in AD, depending on the tasks involved. (3)
Stimulus properties (exposure time and self-relevance): emotion-
ally intense and self-related stimuli are more likely to induce
emotional enhancement effects on declarative memory. Overall,
Klein-Koerkamp et al. (2012) emphasize that understanding the
underlying mechanisms and the factors influencing the memory-
enhancing effect of emotion on memory in AD can poten-
tially guide the development of new therapies, based on using
emotionally salient cues to enhance/guide memory in these
patients.
SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE
The emotional disturbances commonly seen across all drug
dependencies are: (1) heightened reward sensitivity to drug-
related stimuli (incentive sensitization), (2) reduced sensitivity
to natural reward stimuli, and (3) weakened cognitive con-
trol, reflected in diminished PFC engagement and heightened
sensitivity in the brain’s stress systems that respond to threats
(Murphy et al., 2012; Volkow et al., 2013). In their contribu-
tion to the present collection, Murphy et al. (2012) argue that
the baseline dopamine levels in these patients are low, and when
drug cues (but not natural reward stimuli) are presented, high
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levels of dopamine are released, which results in drug crav-
ing. This suggests an overall reward deficiency (reduced sensi-
tive to natural reward stimuli) but sensitized reward systems to
drug cues in substance dependence. Murphy et al. (2012) also
propose that emotional dysregulation could be the causal fac-
tors for impulsive behavior and poor decision–making in these
patients.
As we have reviewed how disturbances of emotion-cognition
interactions result in various types of disorders, we cannot neglect
the significant role of puberty in the maturation of emotion-
cognition interactions (Ladouceur, 2012). One factor during
puberty could be related to changes in the production of sex
hormones, which can affect the response to emotionally salient
distractors, possibly because of the influence of sex hormones
on the functional connectivity of PFC regions. Another impor-
tant factor that affects the maturity of the affective and cognitive
systems is early-life stress. It has been well-documented that early-
life stress is associated with psychiatric disorders in adults. Here,
Flynn and Rudolph (2012) provide new evidence that maternal
depression (but not anxiety) predicts increased negative bias in
adolescents with high levels of interpersonal emotional reactivity.
However, maternal depression does not predict cognitive biases
in those exhibiting low levels of interpersonal emotional reactiv-
ity during adolescence. This finding that maternal depression but
not maternal anxiety predicts negative bias needs replication to
elucidate the mechanisms of possible “depression transmission.”
Examination of the impact of sex hormones, genetic changes, per-
sonality, and of early-life stress on the development and maturity
of emotional and cognitive systems are all active research areas,
which may shed light on the neural mechanisms and potential
treatment for psychiatric disorders, which tend to onset during
early developmental stages.
One of the critical issues hampering clinical diagnosis for
psychiatric disorders using objective measures (biomarkers) is
the heterogeneous manifestations of the mental disorders. There
is a need for new models to better accommodate large indi-
vidual variance. In his review article, Northoff (2012) proposes
an interesting theory that our awareness of emotional feelings
is determined by the body-environment relation, which may
be translated through neural activity. Although there are con-
siderable variations in disruptions of psychological processes
among the clinical conditions discussed above, to some degree
all these disorders have dysfunctions in the prefrontal-striato-
limbic-thalamus networks. Hence, Northoff (2012) proposes that
it is necessary to study these disorders together under a new
comprehensive model, such as the frame of body-environment
relationship. The proposed framework has important empiri-
cal and conceptual implications, and ideally future approaches
will also involve systematic studies linking abnormal findings
at molecular/cellular, system, and psychological levels, to better
understand the neuropathology of different psychiatric disorders
(Anticevic and Corlett, 2012).
Overall, as illustrated by the present collection of contribu-
tions, emotion-cognition interactions can be identified at different
levels of processing, from perception and attention to long-term
memory, decision making processes, and social cognition and behav-
ior. Notably, these effects are subject to individual differences that
may affect the way we perceive, experience, and remember emo-
tional experiences, or cope with emotionally challenging situations.
Moreover, these opposing effects tend to co-occur in affective disor-
ders, such as depression and PTSD, where uncontrolled recollection
of and rumination on distressing memories also lead to impaired
cognition due to emotional distraction. Understanding the nature
and neural mechanisms of these effects is critical, as their exacer-
bation and co-occurrence in clinical conditions lead to devastating
effects and debilitation. Hence, bringing together such diverse con-
tributions has allowed not only an integrative understanding of the
current extant evidence but also identification of emerging directions
and concrete venues for future investigations.
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